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Note 
 
Making Pesticides Public: A Disclosure-Based 
Approach to Regulating Pesticide Use 
Brian Jacobson 
The last straw for Nick Messer, the owner of a small family 
farm in Todd County, Minnesota, came when a gust of wind 
blew a pesticide cloud straight toward his house, possibly ex-
posing his daughter Whitney to serious health effects.1 Mr. 
Messer, who raises horses and dogs on his small farm, lost sev-
eral animals to chemical-related illnesses after pesticides were 
carelessly sprayed on adjacent fields, and sometimes even with-
in his own pasture.2 When his daughter was put at risk, Mr. 
Messer and his family doctor stepped up their efforts to obtain 
records of the circumstances surrounding the application of 
pesticides on neighboring lands, but their repeated requests for 
information from the Minnesota Department of Agriculture 
were denied.3 Mr. Messer discovered that the records concern-
ing pesticide application were classified as private under Min-
nesota law and protected from the public, thus frustrating his 
desire to protect his family’s health and hold someone account-
able for the irresponsible spraying of chemicals.4 
Pesticide-application records are presumptively unavaila-
ble to the public because they are classified as private or non-
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 1. Dan Gunderson, Pesticide Records Are Protected, MINN. PUB. RADIO, 
(Feb. 17, 2003), http://news.minnesota.publicradio.org/features/2003/02/18_ 
gundersond_fivepesticide/. 
 2. Id. 
 3. Id. 
 4. Id.  
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public data under Minnesota Statutes section 18B.37.5 As a re-
sult, absent a medical emergency, farmers and other landown-
ers adjacent to fields where pesticides are applied have no 
means of ensuring that chemicals are being applied safely and 
in a way that minimizes the risk of damage to their families 
and their livelihoods.6 This lack of access to information per-
sists at a time when pesticide application, and the concomitant 
risk of misuse, is steadily increasing.7 
Pesticide-registration and labeling-requirements are gov-
erned largely by the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Ro-
denticide Act (FIFRA), which does not provide for a private 
cause of action.8 However, in Bates v. Dow Agrosciences LLC, 
the Supreme Court indicated a willingness to allow state com-
mon-law damage remedies by ruling that FIFRA did not 
preempt common-law claims that were not competing require-
ments for labeling.9 And yet a lack of data about the circum-
stances in which pesticides were applied can make an individu-
al lawsuit expensive, risky, and often difficult or unsuccessful.10 
With individual citizens unable to access the data to protect 
themselves, the task of regulating pesticide application falls to 
 
 5. MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 5 (2010).  
 6. Id. subdiv. 6. Even with this provision, however, it can be difficult for 
a person who suspects she has been exposed to pesticides to ascertain what 
kind of chemical was used and how it was applied, as evidenced by the case of 
Nick Messer. See Gunderson, supra note 1.  
 7. See John H. Davidson, The Federal Farm Bill and the Environment, 
18 NAT. RESOURCES & ENV’T, Summer 2003, at 3 (describing how the 750 mil-
lion tons of pesticides that farmers apply to their crops each year contribute to 
agricultural runoff ). Compare ARNOLD L. ASPELIN, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGEN-
CY, PESTICIDES INDUSTRY SALES AND USAGE: 1994 AND 1995 MARKET ESTI-
MATES 14 (1997) (4.4 billion total pounds of pesticides used in 1994), with 
ARTHUR GRUBE ET AL., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, PESTICIDES INDUSTRY 
SALES AND USAGE: 2006 AND 2007 MARKET ESTIMATES 10 (2011) (5.1 billion 
total pounds of pesticides used in 2007). 
 8. See No Spray Coal. Inc. v. City of N.Y., 351 F.3d 602, 605 (2d Cir. 
2003) (noting that in enacting FIFRA, Congress did not provide that its provi-
sions might be enforced through a citizen suit, though it had done so in other 
environmental protection statutes). 
 9. 544 U.S. 431, 443–44 (2005). 
 10. See Alexandra B. Klass, Pesticides, Children’s Health Policy, and 
Common Law Tort Claims, 7 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 89, 110 (2005).  
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state departments of agriculture,11 which for lack of funding or 
resources cannot always carry out complete investigations.12 
This Note argues that making pesticide-application records 
available to the public would provide harmed individuals with 
the information to hold negligent applicators accountable and, 
through the threat of litigation, provide an incentive for appli-
cators to act responsibly in using pesticides, even before harm 
is caused. Part I explores the classification of pesticide-
application records as nonpublic or private under the Minneso-
ta Data Practices Act. Part II provides an overview of the theo-
ry and effectiveness of regulation by making information public 
and accessible in environmental law. Part III discusses the new 
availability of state common-law damages claims in pesticide 
cases, and contends that such private enforcement could effec-
tuate another type of regulation by information. This Note con-
cludes by arguing that making data surrounding pesticide ap-
plication available to the public is both an efficient and 
equitable means to aid in the prevention of irresponsible pesti-
cide use, and that states should adopt pesticide-use disclosure 
programs to achieve this end. An increased receptivity to state 
common-law claims for pesticide damages suggests that private 
litigation represents a new opportunity to further strengthen 
the regulatory influence of information disclosure. 
I.  DATA PRACTICES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
INFORMATION   
In 1966, Congress enacted the Freedom of Information Act 
(FOIA), allowing the general public to obtain access to all fed-
eral agency records, subject to nine specifically enumerated ex-
ceptions.13 FOIA completely reformed government data practic-
es, and reflected the growing importance placed on openness 
and transparency in government.14 Upon signing the bill into 
law, President Lyndon Johnson declared,  
 
 11. See, e.g., Pesticides: Overview, MINN. DEP’T OF HEALTH, http://www. 
health.state.mn.us/divs/eh/pesticide/overview.html ( last visited Jan. 2, 2012); 
Pesticide Enforcement Program, N.D. DEP’T OF AGRIC., http://www.nd.gov/ndda 
/program/pesticide-enforcement-program ( last visited Jan. 2, 2012). 
 12. See Gunderson, supra note 1 (noting that the MDA in certain circum-
stances just sends an advisory notice to sprayers who have broken the law, 
and that warnings are more common than fines). 
 13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3), (b) (2006). 
 14. See Fred H. Cate et al., The Right to Privacy and the Public’s Right to 
Know: The “Central Purpose” of the Freedom of Information Act, 46 ADMIN. L. 
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[t]his legislation springs from one of our most essential principles: A 
democracy works best when the people have all the information that 
the security of the Nation permits. No one should be able to pull cur-
tains of secrecy around decisions which can be revealed without inju-
ry to the public interest.15 
This commitment to openness and making information ac-
cessible has been taken up by the states as well, and today all 
fifty states have some type of open records statute, many of 
which are modeled on the federal FOIA.16 
Despite this emphasis on transparency and the availability 
of government data, in many states pesticide-application data 
collected by a government agency is treated differently. An in-
formal survey conducted by the Association of American Pesti-
cide Control Officers (AAPCO) indicated that the majority of 
states have significant barriers to public access to pesticide-
application data.17 Many states, such as Minnesota, have cho-
sen to classify such data as private or nonpublic,18 and even 
when states lack such an affirmative protection the investigat-
ing public often faces other obstacles to accessing chemical use 
information.19 A look at data practices for pesticide-application 
records in Minnesota shows how critical pesticide information 
is often shielded from the public, and demonstrates the insuffi-
ciency of current federal and state reporting requirements for 
ensuring responsible pesticide use. This Part provides an over-
view of the field of information regulation and suggests that a 
similar approach might be effective in regulating pesticide ap-
plication. Finally, the new receptivity to state common-law 
claims indicated by the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates v. 
 
REV. 41, 42 (1994) (“FOIA is intended to provide the citizenry with the 
knowledge necessary to govern.”). 
 15. Statement by the President Upon Signing the “Freedom of Infor-
mation Act,” 2 PUB. PAPERS 699 (July 4, 1966).  
 16. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy, and 
the Constitution, 86 MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1161 (2002). 
 17. E-mails from Respondents to Association of American Pesticide Con-
trol Officers Survey, Question to State Lead Agencies: Privacy of Pesticide Ap-
plication Records, to Paul Liemandt, Minn. Dep’t of Agric. (various dates in 
2007) (on file with author).  
 18. See id. 
 19. In response to the AAPCO survey, several states indicated that alt-
hough pesticide records were not addressed in data practices law, and thus 
were not explicitly protected, as a practical matter public access to information 
was very restricted. The Nebraska Department of Agriculture, for example, 
responded that since pesticide information was not addressed by statute, it 
would be up to the applicators to provide access to such records, and “the like-
lihood of that is nil.” Id.  
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Dow Agrosciences LLC suggests that litigation presents a pow-
erful new approach to complement the traditional regulatory 
influences of information disclosure.20 
A. MINNESOTA GOVERNMENT DATA PRACTICES ACT 
In 1974, shortly after Congress passed the federal Freedom 
of Information Act, the Minnesota Legislature enacted the Gov-
ernment Data Practices Act in response to the revelations of 
government intrusion during the administration of President 
Richard M. Nixon.21 The Act, set out in chapter 13 of the Min-
nesota Statutes, establishes a presumption that all government 
data in Minnesota is available to the public.22 Its provisions ap-
ply to information in any form23 held by state agencies, Minne-
sota State Colleges and Universities, political subdivisions, 
statewide systems, and corporations and nonprofit social ser-
vice agencies under contract with a government entity.24 This 
presumption notwithstanding, the Act goes on to classify cer-
tain types of data as private or otherwise nonpublic, thus re-
stricting access to data.25 Data that is classified by statute as 
other than public falls into one of four categories: private data, 
confidential data, nonpublic, and protected nonpublic.26 Minne-
sota Statutes section 18B.37 governs pesticide-application in-
formation and recordkeeping requirements, and subdivision 5 
makes clear that “the information in the records in this section 
is private or nonpublic.”27 
Thus, despite the presumptive commitment to making gov-
ernment-collected data available to the public, Minnesota has 
chosen to impose a high barrier to public access to pesticide-
application records.28 But even though the public lacks access, 
federal and state statutes requiring applicators to keep accu-
rate records ensure that the records still exist.29 This means 
 
 20. 544 U.S. 431, 443–44 (2005).  
 21. Gary A. Weissman & Donald A. Gemberling, Access to Court Records 
in Minnesota, BENCH & B. MINN., Apr. 2008, at 30. 
 22. MINN. STAT. § 13.03, subdiv. 1 (2010). 
 23. Id. subdiv. 7. 
 24. MATT GEHRING, MINN. H. RESEARCH DEP’T, MINNESOTA GOVERN-
MENT DATA PRACTICES ACT: AN OVERVIEW 2 (2010). 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. at 3. 
 27. MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 5. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1 (2006). 
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that the hard data needed to monitor pesticide use already ex-
ists—it is just not in the right hands. 
B. PESTICIDE APPLICATOR RECORDKEEPING 
Though the information is often hard to get at, federal and 
state statutes mandate that pesticide applicators keep track of 
the types of pesticides they use and the conditions in which the 
pesticides are applied. The Federal Food, Agriculture, Conser-
vation and Trade Act (FACT) of 1990 requires certified pesti-
cide applicators to maintain detailed records regarding the use 
of restricted-use pesticides.30 The Pesticide Records Branch, es-
tablished by the USDA to administer the recordkeeping provi-
sions of FACT, monitors various agricultural industries to en-
sure that pesticide applicators maintain records in compliance 
with federal regulations or recognized state regulations.31 This 
oversight is carried out by state and USDA officials through co-
operative and interagency agreements.32 Among other things, a 
typical application record requires the name of the product, the 
total amount applied, and the date and location of the applica-
tion.33 FACT requires that the application information be rec-
orded within thirty days of application, and that the record be 
kept for a minimum of two years after each application.34 
The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) provides for the classification of different types of pes-
ticides subject to recordkeeping requirements, and distin-
guishes between certain types of applicators.35 A pesticide is 
classified as “restricted use” when the EPA has determined ei-
ther that the pesticide presents a hazard to the applicator due 
to its “acute dermal or inhalation toxicity,” or that “its use 
without additional regulatory restriction may cause unreason-
able adverse effects on the environment.”36 Restricted-use pesti-
 
 30. Id. 
 31. U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., AGRIC. MKTG. SERV., FEDERAL PESTICIDE 
RECORDKEEPING PROGRAM HIGHLIGHTS 1 (2009). When a state maintains 
comparable recordkeeping regulations, the Pesticide Record Branch “allows 
applicators in those States to comply with the State pesticide regulations, thus 
eliminating the burden of maintaining duplicate [restricted-use pesticide] rec-
ords.” Id. 
 32. Id. at 3. 
 33. Id. at 2. 
 34. 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1(a). 
 35. Id. §§ 136–136y. 
 36. Id. § 136a(d)(1)(C). 
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cides may only be applied by certified applicators, while general 
use pesticides can be applied by anyone.37  
Within the realm of restricted pesticide use, FIFRA further 
distinguishes between private applicators and commercial ap-
plicators.38 A private applicator is one who uses, or supervises 
the use of, restricted pesticides for agricultural commodity pro-
duction on property owned or leased by himself or his employer, 
while a commercial applicator is one who is hired to apply re-
stricted-use pesticides.39 Both are required to meet certain pro-
cedures and rules established by the EPA for qualifying for cer-
tification, but commercial applicators are held to much more 
stringent standards.40 Both certified private and commercial 
applicators must maintain records pursuant to the require-
ments set out in FACT, as well as any additional state-level 
recordkeeping requirements.41 
In Minnesota, statutory pesticide-application recordkeep-
ing requirements likewise apply to both commercial and non-
commercial applicators.42 The information required by those 
statutes closely resembles the requirements of FACT and in-
cludes important data such as the date and time of the applica-
tion, the location of the application, and the temperature, wind 
direction, and wind speed at the time of the application.43 Cop-
ies of the application record must be kept for a period of five 
years after the date of the treatment in Minnesota, three years 
longer than the time period required by FACT.44 Furthermore, 
Minnesota Statutes section 18B.064 mandates that the Minne-
sota Department of Agriculture (MDA) monitor urban and ru-
ral pesticide use, and collect pesticide-use information on a bi-
ennial basis.45 Specifically, the application data is to be 
collected and automated consistent with the state’s land-
 
 37. MICHAEL T. OLEXA, LAWS GOVERNING USE AND IMPACT OF AGRICUL-
TURAL CHEMICALS: REGISTRATION, LABELING, AND THE USE OF PESTICIDES 1 
(Fla. Coop. Extension Serv., Inst. of Food & Agric. Scis., Fact Sheet FRE-71, 
1995). 
 38. 7 U.S.C. § 136(e)(2)–(3). 
 39. Id.  
 40. See OLEXA, supra note 37, at 2.  
 41. 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1(a). 
 42. MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 2 (2010). 
 43. Compare the requirements in FACT, 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1(a), with the 
Minnesota requirements, MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 2. 
 44. Compare 7 U.S.C. § 136i-1(a) (two-year requirement), with MINN. 
STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 2(e) (five-year requirement). 
 45. MINN. STAT. § 18B.064.  
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management information system, which means that “the legis-
lature directed the MDA to gather information enabling it to 
know how much of what types of pesticides are used where in 
the state.”46 
C. SHORTCOMINGS OF FIFRA REGULATION AND 
RECORDKEEPING 
Despite all the recordkeeping requirements and pesticide-
registration standards detailed in FIFRA and Minnesota Stat-
utes section 18B, these regulatory schemes have little effect on 
ensuring responsible pesticide use.47 In large part, the problem 
stems from the fact that these statutes clearly require pesticide 
applicators to maintain records, but impose no requirements to 
report those records to anyone.48 As some commentators have 
observed, certified applicators must comply with both federal 
and state recordkeeping requirements, “but they need not re-
port the applications to anyone unless a federal agen-
cy . . . , state agency . . . , or health professional administering 
medical treatment so requests or state law requires regular 
disclosure.”49 Since there is no comprehensive reporting or dis-
closure requirement at the federal level, it is up to states to col-
lect or require disclosure of pesticide-application data.50 But as 
noted above, Minnesota has indicated that such records are 
considered private or nonpublic.51 Instead, FIFRA primarily 
regulates pesticide-registration standards and labeling require-
ments, which are the basis for its enforcement provisions.52 
 
 46. ROBERT M. ELEFF, MINN. CTR. FOR ENVTL. ADVOCACY, INACTION 
SPEAKS LOUDER THAN WORDS: THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF AGRICUL-
TURE’S FAILURE TO PROTECT MINNESOTA FROM PESTICIDE CONTAMINATION 49 
(2001). 
 47. See J.B. Ruhl, Farms, Their Environmental Harms, and Environmen-
tal Law, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 263, 310 (2000) (“Direct regulation of farms . . . is 
not a main concern of FIFRA; the statute does little more than require that 
pesticides be applied by certified persons and consistent with their label in-
structions.”).  
 48. OLEXA, supra note 37, at 6 (“Certified applicators have no reporting 
requirements under FACT . . . .”). Minnesota law, however, does require that 
commercial applicators provide a copy of the pesticide-application record to the 
customer. MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 2(d). 
 49. Ruhl, supra note 47, at 311. 
 50. Id. (“Although some states regulate pesticide applications more ag-
gressively than does FIFRA, it is fair to say that the nation has no comprehen-
sive regulatory framework governing farm use of pesticides.”). 
 51. MINN. STAT. § 18B.37, subdiv. 5. 
 52. See OLEXA, supra note 37, at 1–3. 
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In Minnesota, the MDA has a statutory mandate to collect 
pesticide-use data, and it can inspect and make copies of the 
data as part of an investigation or enforcement action.53 Also, 
when pesticide exposure is suspected of playing a role in a seri-
ous medical condition, a treating physician or veterinarian can 
request such records for purposes of the diagnosis, care, or 
treatment of a patient.54 Obviously, having access to application 
information is crucial to ensuring responsible pesticide use and 
protecting Minnesota’s people and natural resources.55 Practical 
and financial concerns, however, often make it difficult—if not 
impossible—for a state agency like the MDA to effectively fulfill 
its role in collecting such information.56 A study by the Minne-
sota Center for Environmental Advocacy indicated that the 
MDA’s pesticide-use data collection efforts have been incom-
plete and inconsistent, and as a result the agency is largely ig-
norant about the patterns and trends of actual pesticide use in 
the state.57 And although the MDA is authorized to inspect rec-
ords as part of an official investigation if it has reason to sus-
pect a violation, some sources suggest that violations are rarely 
aggressively investigated and will often go unpunished.58 As the 
case of Nick Messer demonstrates, even when pesticide expo-
sure implicates human health, application records can be diffi-
cult to obtain.59  
Given the obstacles associated with agency limitations and 
other barriers to accessing pesticide-application information, it 
makes sense to take a new approach to the use of such data. 
 
 53. MINN. STAT. § 18B.064; id. § 18B.37, subdiv. 5 (“The commissioner 
may enter a commercial, noncommercial, or structural pest control applicator’s 
business and inspect the records required in this section at any reasonable 
time and may make copies of the records.”). 
 54. Id. § 18B.37, subdiv. 6. 
 55. ELEFF, supra note 46 (“Few would argue that in order for the MDA to 
effectively protect Minnesota’s resources against pesticide contamination, it 
needs to know some basic information about how pesticides are actually used 
in the state.”).  
 56. See, e.g., id. (“MDA has failed to effectively meet its statutory obliga-
tion to collect pesticide use data. It collects virtually no data on urban use and 
very little on rural use.”). 
 57. See id. at 49–50. 
 58. See Dan Gunderson, Clouds of Doubt: Questions About Enforcement of 
Pesticide Laws, MINN. PUB. RADIO, (Feb. 17, 2003), http://news.minnesota 
.publicradio.org/features/2003/02/18_gundersond_onepesticide/ (describing find-
ings of an MPR investigation showing that “violations of the law are often un-
punished, and sometimes ignored,” and that “in some cases, even when the law 
is clearly broken, the department takes no action”). 
 59. See supra text accompanying notes 1–4. 
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The field of information regulation suggests that implementing 
data disclosure requirements can be a powerful alternative to 
direct agency regulation. 
D. INFORMATION REGULATION THEORY 
Traditional government regulation, as carried out by vari-
ous agencies, takes the form of a top-down, or command-and-
control, approach.60 In such a system, statutes and implement-
ing rules tend to create direct restrictions on regulated parties, 
often by way of establishing output performance standards or 
requiring certain procedural characteristics.61 The relationship 
between the agency responsible for regulation and the regulat-
ed party is usually direct, in the sense that both the regulatory 
standards and enforcement actions are imposed directly on the 
regulated party by the agency.62 While such top-down, direct 
government regulation has long been entrenched as a central 
feature of the American regulatory system,63 its shortcomings 
have created a growing appreciation for a less costly, more effi-
cient approach to regulation.64 Direct command-and-control 
regulation may be particularly poorly suited for the agricultur-
al sector, and so a different regulatory strategy seems appro-
priate in the context of farms and pesticide application.65 
 
 60. See, e.g., Bruce A. Ackerman & Richard B. Stewart, Reforming Envi-
ronmental Law, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1333, 1339 (1985) (describing the “serious 
inefficiency of traditional forms of command-and-control regulation,” and ar-
guing that a market-based approach could help cure some of the existing  
deficiencies). 
 61. Paul R. Kleindorfer & Eric W. Orts, Informational Regulation of Envi-
ronmental Risks, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 155, 156 (1998). 
 62. Id. at 157 fig.1. 
 63. See Ackerman & Stewart, supra note 60, at 1334 (“The congressional 
committees, government bureaucracies, and industry and environmental 
groups that have helped to shape the present system want to see it perpetuat-
ed. . . . [T]he current system is also bolstered by an often inarticulate sense 
that, however cumbersome, it ‘works,’ and that complexity and limited infor-
mation make major improvements infeasible.”). 
 64. See William F. Pedersen, Regulation and Information Disclosure: Par-
allel Universes and Beyond, 25 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 151, 151 (2001) (“Alt-
hough controlling social costs has long been a basic government function, di-
rect government commands currently stand in low regard as a means of 
controlling them.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Informational Regulation and Informa-
tional Standing: Akins and Beyond, 147 U. PA. L. REV. 613, 618–19 (1999) (de-
scribing the surge in information regulation as a relatively recent phenomenon 
tied to the rights movement of the 1960s and 1970s). 
 65. Margot J. Pollans, Note, Bundling Public and Private Goods: The 
Market for Sustainable Organics, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 621, 622 (2010) (“The 
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Information regulation, by contrast, has been defined as 
“any regulation which provides to third parties information on 
company operations.”66 In practice, information regulation can 
take different forms, but generally requires that a regulated 
entity disclose certain information regarding its performance or 
procedure to the public with the hope of improving the entity’s 
behavior or ensuring that it meets specified regulatory stand-
ards.67 Information regulation takes advantage of the influence 
third parties can have on regulated entities by way of “sup-
ply[ing] ‘regulatory’ pressure through market dynamics, private 
litigation, or moral persuasion.”68 Supporters of information 
regulation cite its flexibility, potential for influence, and rela-
tively minimal intrusion into the affairs of private entities as 
reasons to extend the use of information-based regulatory 
strategies.69 A disclosure-based approach to addressing social 
costs can also “empower communities and citizen groups to ad-
dress the problems disclosure reveals without the inefficiencies 
and the overriding of local preferences that inevitably attend 
national regulation.”70 And finally, implementing disclosure re-
quirements helps avoid the burdens and high informational 
costs associated with traditional agency promulgation of guide-
lines and rules, since “[i]nformation is the outcome of the pro-
gram and is collected, not by an agency, but by the regulated 
entity itself.”71 
An additional powerful, if slightly more controversial, tool 
often facilitated by information regulation is the regulatory 
pressure exerted by private litigation. Lawsuits brought by in-
dividual citizens have often played an important role in ensur-
ing regulatory compliance.72 Until recently, however, courts had 
 
command-and-control environmental regulations that apply to most other 
American industries do not apply to farming.”). 
 66. See Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 61. 
 67. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 619 (“Some of these [disclosure re-
quirements] are designed to assist consumers in making informed choices; 
such statutes are meant to be market-enhancing. By contrast, others are de-
signed to trigger political, rather than market, safeguards; such statutes are 
meant to enhance democratic processes.”). 
 68. Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 61, at 157. 
 69. See Pollans, supra note 65, at 634. 
 70. Pedersen, supra note 64. 
 71. Warren A. Braunig, Note, Reflexive Law Solutions for Factory Farm 
Pollution, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1505, 1524–25 (2005).  
 72. See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Prod-
ucts Through Tort Litigation, 95 GEO. L.J. 693, 712–13 (2007) (describing the 
success of tort litigation in regulating many dangerous or toxic products in 
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interpreted federal law pertaining to pesticide-labeling re-
quirements as preempting state common-law tort claims, min-
imizing the potential of private litigation in pesticide regula-
tion. The Supreme Court’s recent decision in Bates v. Dow 
Agrosciences LLC overturned the presumption of preemption, 
and indicated a new willingness to consider state common law 
claims in pesticide-related actions.73 
E. EXPANDED POTENTIAL FOR TORT LITIGATION CREATED BY 
BATES 
Though the threat of litigation frequently plays an im-
portant role in ensuring regulatory compliance, federal 
preemption has long frustrated state common-law claims for 
damages in the context of pesticide-related harms. Until recent-
ly, the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
(FIFRA) had posed a serious barrier to private recovery for an 
individual who has suffered damages related to irresponsible 
pesticide application.74 FIFRA contains a specific preemption 
clause in a section covering uniformity, which states, “[s]uch 
State shall not impose or continue in effect any requirements 
for labeling or packaging in addition to or different from those 
required under this Act.”75 While on its face this provision does 
not appear to automatically preempt state-law tort claims, it 
had been held to have that practical effect because successful 
state common-law actions might force pesticide manufacturers 
to change their labeling or packaging.76 Thus, a successful 
state-law tort claim for damages had the practical effect of im-
posing additional or different labeling requirements, and, argu-
 
situations where firm operators misrepresented or withheld critical pollution 
information). 
 73. 544 U.S. 431, 440–43 (2005). 
 74. See Sherrie M. Flynn, FIFRA’s Puzzling Failure-To-Warn Preemption: 
Pesticide Use and the Right-To-Know, 13 SAN JOAQUIN AGRIC. L. REV. 173, 176 
(2003) (“[T]he overwhelming majority of courts that have addressed the issue 
of whether failure-to-warn claims are preempted by FIFRA, including eight 
federal circuit courts of appeal, have determined that they are.”); Klass, supra 
note 10, at 118–19 (“Although some early cases had interpreted FIFRA 
preemption narrowly to retain a significant role for common law tort claims, 
they were quickly followed by decisions in nearly every federal circuit applying 
FIFRA preemption broadly to prevent plaintiffs from using the tort law sys-
tem to obtain compensation for pesticide-related harm and shape corporate 
behavior.”). 
 75. 7 U.S.C. § 136v(b) (2006). 
 76. Flynn, supra note 74, at 182. 
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ably, was preempted by section 136v(b) of FIFRA.77 Prior to 
2005, the debate over the proper interpretation of this preemp-
tive provision was shaped by the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., in which the Court examined 
the preemptive effect of the 1969 Cigarette Act.78 The language 
of the Cigarette Act closely resembles the language of FIFRA in 
that it forbids states from imposing any requirement or prohi-
bition based on smoking and health “with respect to the adver-
tising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are 
labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.”79 In 
holding that the state-law failure-to-warn claim was preempt-
ed, the Cipollone Court indicated that “[t]he phrase ‘no re-
quirement or prohibition’ sweeps broadly and suggests no dis-
tinction between positive enactments and common law.”80 
The preemptive effect of FIFRA’s provisions narrowed sig-
nificantly with the Supreme Court’s 2005 decision in Bates v. 
Dow Agrosciences LLC.81 In Bates, the Supreme Court consid-
ered a Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that a plaintiff ’s 
state-law claims for crop damages caused by the herbicide 
“Strongarm” were preempted by FIFRA because recovery under 
those claims would impose a labeling requirement in addition 
to or different from those outlined in FIFRA.82 The Supreme 
Court rejected this effects-based approach to interpreting 
preemption, instead adopting an analysis that considered 
whether the state-law claim would impose any requirements 
that were more burdensome than those of FIFRA.83 Noting that 
allowing certain private state-law claims “would seem to aid, 
rather than hinder, the functioning of FIFRA,” the Court held 
that “nothing in § 136v(b) precludes States from providing such 
a remedy.”84 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates, 
state legislatures and courts are able to “create statutory and 
common law damage remedies for violations of federal labeling 
requirements.”85 
 
 77. Id.  
 78. 505 U.S. 504, 504–05 (1992). 
 79. 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b) (2006). 
 80. Cipollone, 505 U.S. at 521. 
 81. 544 U.S. 431, 443–44 (2005). 
 82. Id. at 436. 
 83. Id. at 447. 
 84. Id. at 448. 
 85. Klass, supra note 10, at 124. 
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The Supreme Court’s new receptivity to common-law tort 
claims in pesticide exposure cases adds the possibility of a new 
tool in information regulation. Though traditional information 
disclosure systems have operated through the influence of pub-
lic opinion and external monitoring pressures, the threat of a 
tort lawsuit represents perhaps an even more powerful incen-
tive for responsible use by pesticide applicators. An analysis of 
existing information disclosure systems combined with the po-
tential threat of tort litigation will show that public disclosure 
of pesticide-application information can play a powerful regula-
tory role. 
II.  REGULATION BY DISCLOSURE AND THE POTENTIAL 
OF LITIGATION   
The idea of public information serving a regulatory func-
tion is far from new; disclosure requirements and information 
dissemination assume a central role in regulatory strategies 
adopted in other fields. The strategy is found most conspicuous-
ly in the work of the Securities and Exchange Commission and 
the public disclosure requirements throughout the federal secu-
rities laws.86 Other well-known examples of information regula-
tion include the required disclosure of serious health risks by 
the tobacco industry, the hazard communication programs 
adopted by employers under OSHA, and the Food and Drug 
Administration’s disclosure requirements through nutritional 
labeling.87 Only recently, however, has information regulation 
received much attention in an environmental context.88 This 
Part analyzes the approach of information disclosure in an en-
vironmental context generally, identifying the factors that have 
led to its largely successful implementation and arguing that 
those same factors would translate to effective regulation in the 
field of pesticide application. It then examines the evolution of 
pesticide-use reporting requirements in California, and sug-
gests that many of the initial burdens of adopting reporting re-
 
 86. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 618 (noting the surge in agency regu-
lation in the New Deal era and explaining that “disclosure of information be-
came a pervasive regulatory strategy, most obviously through the work of the 
Securities and Exchange Commission”). 
 87. Id. at 619–20. 
 88. David W. Case, The Law and Economics of Environmental Infor-
mation as Regulation, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,773, 10,773 
(2001) (“Since 1970, ‘command-and-control’ has been the predominant form of 
regulation used to implement environmental protection policy in the United 
States.”). 
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quirements will be avoided by learning from the lessons of its 
reporting system. Finally, this Part responds to many of the 
traditional criticisms of using litigation as a regulatory tool, 
and argues that the newly created potential for common-law 
damage claims will make disclosure requirements even more 
effective. 
A. SUCCESS OF DISCLOSURE IN AN ENVIRONMENTAL CONTEXT 
In the last quarter of the twentieth century, informational 
regulation of environmental risks has grown in prominence.89 
One of the most prominent examples of largely successful in-
formation regulation in an environmental context is the use of 
disclosure requirements implemented by the Toxic Release In-
ventory (TRI) program. The success of this disclosure system in 
raising public awareness of the dangers of toxic chemicals, and 
spurring voluntary reductions in their release, provides a blue-
print for pesticide-use disclosure programs. 
The Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
Act (EPCRA) established a Toxic Release Inventory in 1986 to 
address the rapidly increasing use of toxic chemicals and their 
release into the environment.90 The EPCRA gives the public the 
right to know about toxic chemicals being released into the en-
vironment, and requires facilities in industries that manufac-
ture, process, or otherwise use significant amounts of toxic 
chemicals to file an annual report on their releases of these 
chemicals.91 Businesses or industries that make use of chemi-
cals considered toxic file a toxic-release chemical form with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) that describes the 
general use of the chemical, estimates the amount of the chem-
ical on hand, reports the amount released into the environ-
ment, and identifies waste treatment or disposal methods.92 
The statute identifies a list of chemicals to be included in the 
 
 89. See Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 61, at 155 (discussing various ex-
amples of information regulation programs that emerged towards the end of 
the twentieth century, such as the use of eco-labels, the disclosure require-
ments of the Clean Air Act Amendments, and the consumer confidence reports 
under the Safe Drinking Water Act Amendments).  
 90. 42 U.S.C. §§ 11001–50 (2006). 
 91. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, TOXICS RELEASE INVENTORY PROGRAM 
FACT SHEET (2011), available at http://www.epa.gov/tri/triprogram/tri_program_ 
fact_sheet.htm. 
 92. 42 U.S.C. § 11023; see also Kleindorfer & Orts, supra note 61, at 155 
n.3 (summarizing reporting requirements under EPCRA). 
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chemical report,93 and provides for the EPA to make additions 
upon determining that a chemical can reasonably be expected 
to cause significant adverse human health effects.94 The statute 
also requires the EPA to use the data obtained in these reports 
to establish a national toxic chemical inventory in a computer 
database, and to make that information accessible to the  
public.95 
TRI was widely regarded as resoundingly successful in 
bringing about voluntary toxic emissions reductions from the 
facilities and industries it covers.96 From 1988 to 1999, TRI da-
ta on the consistently reported core industrial chemicals shows 
that total toxic releases decreased by 45.5%, or 1.46 billion 
pounds.97 Commentators credit several different features of the 
TRI system with its overall effectiveness,98 and its success has 
generated a great deal of academic interest and critical analy-
sis.99 Understanding the mechanism by which information dis-
closure systems like TRI operate is of paramount importance to 
replicating their success.100 Before assuming that the success of 
 
 93. 42 U.S.C. § 11023(c) (noting that the reporting requirements apply to 
about 300 chemicals listed in S. REP. NO. 99-169 (1986)).  
 94. Id. § 11023(d)(2). 
 95. Id. § 11023( j). 
 96. David W. Case, Corporate Environmental Reporting as Informational 
Regulation: A Law and Economics Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 385–
86 (2005) (“[C]onsensus is widespread that TRI disclosure has induced signifi-
cant voluntary reductions in covered releases well below levels otherwise re-
quired by existing command-and-control regulation.”); Mark A. Cohen, Infor-
mation as a Policy Instrument in Protecting the Environment: What Have We 
Learned?, 31 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS 10,425, 10,425 (2001) (“[T]he 
TRI program led to significant voluntary decrease in the total amount of TRI 
chemicals released into the United States, beyond any mandated levels.”); 
Sunstein, supra note 64, at 622 (“[The EPCRA] has been an exceptional suc-
cess story, one that has well exceeded the expectations at the time of the stat-
ute’s enactment.”). 
 97. Lynn R. Goldman, Preventing Pollution? U.S. Toxic Chemicals and 
Pesticides Policies and Sustainable Development, 32 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & 
ANALYSIS 11,018, 11,029 (2002).  
 98. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental Regu-
lation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New Paradigm? 89 
GEO. L.J. 257, 261–63 (2001) (noting that the interplay of various aspects of 
TRI led to its success).  
 99. See Case, supra note 88, at 10,775 (“Although numerous examples of 
informational regulatory approaches exist in the environmental arena, § 313 of 
the [EPCRA] is perhaps the most widely analyzed example of this approach.”). 
 100. See Cohen, supra note 96, at 10,426–28 (discussing the need to under-
stand the mechanism by which information disclosure programs exert their 
influence over covered industries and businesses); Archon Fung & Dara 
O’Rourke, Reinventing Environmental Regulation from the Grassroots Up: Ex-
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information disclosure in one area will equate to similar results 
in another context, it is important to understand how disclo-
sure requirements achieve their outcome.101 
For example, not only did TRI require the reporting of tox-
ic-release information and provide it to the public, but it also 
actively disseminated that information through media outlets 
and well-recognized internet sources such as Environmental 
Defense’s “Scorecard” website.102 This active dissemination of 
information helped to ensure public involvement, and allowed 
citizens to engage in monitoring and oversight.103 The influence 
exerted by public opinion has played a heavy role in shaping 
firms’ behavior.104 While traditional command-and-control style 
regulation can mandate minimum standards that must be met 
by firms, exposing toxic-release information to the public pro-
vides an incentive for firms to achieve even lower levels of toxic 
chemical release.105 In response to negative attention from tox-
ic-release information, some covered firms began voluntarily 
publishing reports disclosing positive information about their 
 
plaining and Expanding the Success of the Toxics Release Inventory, 25 ENVTL. 
MGMT. 115, 115 (2000) (“By properly understanding the mechanisms that 
drive TRI’s accomplishments, more intentional public policy designs can ex-
pand the system of populist maxi-min regulation and achieve even more rapid 
toxics reduction.”). 
 101. Cohen, supra note 96, at 10,426 (“[W]e cannot assume the success of 
one program is transferable to another program unless we understand the 
mechanism by which the first program succeeded.”).  
 102. Case, supra note 88, at 10,775; see also Cohen, supra note 96 (contend-
ing that part of TRI’s unique success is due to “new information technologies 
(both hardware and software) that facilitate the dissemination of environmen-
tal information in a meaningful way”). 
 103. See Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 118 (“TRI data are now used 
regularly by individuals, community-based organizations, environmental 
groups, industry managers, state and federal agencies, lawyers, investment 
advisors, and the media. Uses vary from educating and mobilizing affected 
communities to assisting corporate environmental planning, from supporting 
efforts to strengthen regulations to promoting voluntaristic environmental  
initiatives.”). 
 104. See Cohen, supra note 96, at 10,426 (“[T]here is empirical evidence 
that informal community pressure and social norms may play an important 
role in emissions and/or compliance.”). 
 105. See Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 119 (“The TRI catalyzes the 
involvement of ordinary people in the determination of toxics emissions stand-
ards by changing the effective limit that is publicly acceptable rather than le-
gally allowable, whereas command-and-control policies leave discussions of 
toxics to ‘experts’ in environmental agencies, industry, and sometimes envi-
ronmental groups. Ordinary people, it seems, demand lower levels of toxics 
than government regulators.”). 
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environmental operation and performance.106 Some commenta-
tors have theorized that voluntary pollution reduction efforts 
and positive reporting occur because TRI provides corporate 
managers with information that they may not have had prior to 
conducting TRI reporting.107 An early report from a chemical 
industry participant confirmed these impressions, acknowledg-
ing that “[b]eing responsive to citizen concerns and communi-
cating to make the public feel comfortable has changed the way 
manufacturers do business.”108 
Another source of TRI’s success lies in its adoption of data 
reporting in standardized units that allows for the easy com-
parison and analysis of toxic-release information across differ-
ent categories and industries.109 Whereas data reporting under 
more conventional regulatory methods often elicited the mini-
mum amount of data needed to verify compliance, mandatory 
TRI reporting created an entire inventory of standardized sta-
tistics for use in comparison between firms and against histori-
cal performance.110 The use of standardized data reporting also 
makes it easier for the EPA to maintain an intelligible data-
base of this information in a way that is straightforward and 
accessible to the public.111 
B. FINDING GUIDANCE IN ADOPTING REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
FOR PESTICIDES 
Though information disclosure through TRI represents 
somewhat of a singular success, the effectiveness of information 
reporting requirements has given analysts hope that similar 
results could be achieved in other environmental contexts.112 In-
 
 106. Case, supra note 96, at 386.  
 107. Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 119.  
 108. Elizabeth A. Fisher, An Industry Perspective on Reporting Releases of 
Toxic Chemicals, in INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON REPORTING RELEASES 
OF TOXIC CHEMICALS: NOVEMBER 13–15, 1991, at 33, 34 (1991). 
 109. Id. at 33–34. 
 110. See Karkkainen, supra note 98, at 261 (“Because TRI data are report-
ed in standard units, they can be aggregated to produce profiles and perfor-
mance comparisons at the level of the facility, firm, industrial sector, commu-
nity, metropolitan region, state, watershed or other critical ecosystem, and the 
nation as a whole.”). 
 111. Id.  
 112. See Case, supra note 88, at 10,775–76 (“The perceived success of the 
TRI in effecting ‘voluntary’ performance improvements by regulated entities 
has generated significant optimism among scholars and policymakers regard-
ing the potential public policy benefits of expanding the use of informational 
regulation as an environmental protection tool.”). 
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formation disclosure in the context of pesticide use presents a 
different challenge than the regulation of toxic releases since 
the object is not to eliminate pesticides but rather ensure their 
responsible use.113 Unlike toxic chemical releases, which are 
undesirable side-effects of industrial practices, with pesticide 
use the product itself is designed to be toxic.114 In pursuing dis-
closure regulation strategies, then, policy makers must bear in 
mind that pesticide applicators’ incentives differ significantly 
from those of corporate managers dealing with toxic waste.115  
Fortunately several states have already implemented some 
kind of reporting system for certain types of pesticide applica-
tion, providing some guidance for future disclosure strategies.116 
California,117 New York,118 and Oregon119 were among the first 
states to adopt extensive pesticide reporting systems. Since 
then a few other states have followed suit and implemented 
their own pesticide reporting requirements.120 Generally these 
 
 113. See Tom Tietenberg & David Wheeler, Empowering the Community: 
Information Strategies for Pollution Control 5–6 (October 23–25, 1998) (work-
ing paper for Frontiers of Envtl. Econ. Conf.), available at http://www.p2pays 
.org/ref/07/06539.pdf. 
 114. Id. 
 115. See id. (discussing the difference between pollution that is produced as 
the byproduct of a process and pollution that arises from the use of a product). 
 116. SUSAN KEGLEY ET AL., HOOKED ON POISON: PESTICIDE USE IN 
CALIFORNIA: 1991–1998, at 16 (2000) (“California has a unique pesticide use 
reporting (PUR) system that other states in the U.S. are only beginning to 
emulate.”). 
 117. Id. at 15–16 (“Full use reporting for agricultural and commercial ap-
plications of pesticides has been in place since 1990 in the form of the Califor-
nia Pesticide Use Reporting (PUR) system.”).  
 118. The Pesticide Reporting Law, N.Y. ST. DEPT. OF ENVTL. CONSERVA-
TION, http://www.dec.ny.gov/chemical/27506.html ( last visited Jan. 2, 2012) 
(“The Pesticide Reporting Law (PRL) (Environmental Conservation Law Arti-
cle 33, Title 12) was enacted on July 8, 1996. The New York State Department 
of Environmental Conservation (NYSDEC) is responsible for implementing 
the data collection portion of this law.”). 
 119. OR. DEP’T OF AGRIC., OREGON PESTICIDE USE REPORTING SYSTEM: 
ANALYTICAL REVIEW 7 (2000), available at http://library.state.or.us/repository/ 
2010/201007011250354/index.pdf (“New legislation (HB3602) directs the Ore-
gon Department of Agriculture (ODA) to establish a pesticide use reporting 
system to provide government agencies, researchers, policy makers and the 
public a comprehensive, reliable and cost effective system for collecting and 
organizing information on all categories of pesticide use in Oregon, with the 
goal of ensuring public health and safety, and protecting Oregon’s water and 
environment.”). 
 120. Id. at 8 (noting that Arizona, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Wisconsin, 
and Massachusetts all have, or are in the process of adopting, pesticide-use 
reporting requirements).  
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programs have generated a positive response,121 but there is 
still much room for improvement in data-collecting methods 
and implementation.122 California, with its vast agricultural 
systems and full-use pesticide reporting has been a leader in 
tackling pesticide data collection.123 Therefore, an analysis of its 
system will prove helpful. Though the initial adoption of its re-
porting system posed some challenges,124 California’s reporting 
system has evolved to address many of those shortcomings, and 
now serves as a model for states to follow in implementing dis-
closure systems. 
The State of California has utilized some form of limited 
pesticide-use reporting since at least 1950, when the California 
Department of Food and Agriculture indicated that the county 
agricultural commissioners required agricultural pest control 
operators to submit monthly reports on their work.125 In 1990, 
in response to demands for more comprehensive application re-
porting, California became the first state to require full report-
ing of agricultural pesticide use.126 Currently pesticide-use data 
in California is collected by the state’s Department of Pesticide 
Regulation (DPR), which analyzes the data through a number 
of different metrics to assess dangers and identify patterns.127 
Copies of annual reports are made readily available on the DPR 
website, and each report contains guidance as to how to access 
and understand the data.128 
 
 121. See, e.g., Keith Cunningham-Parmeter, A Poisoned Field: Farmwork-
ers, Pesticide Exposure, and Tort Recovery in an Era of Regulatory Failure, 28 
N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 431, 455 (2003) (arguing that a program like 
California’s pesticide-use reporting system, if incorporated on a national scale, 
would prove invaluable to farmworkers who suffered from pesticide exposure 
poisoning incidents); Pesticide Use Reporting, CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REG., 
http://www.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/pur/purmain.htm ( last visited Jan. 2, 2012) (“Cal-
ifornia’s pesticide use reporting program is recognized as the most comprehen-
sive in the world.”).  
 122. See KEGLEY ET AL., supra note 116 (detailing some of the initial limi-
tations of the California Pesticide Use Reporting System and recommending 
improvements). 
 123. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 121, at 446 n.100 (“California is a 
leader among the states because of its fairly detailed reporting system.”). 
 124. KEGLEY ET AL., supra note 116, at 45–46.  
 125. CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, REGULATING PESTICIDES: THE 
CALIFORNIA STORY 69 (Veda Federighi, ed., 2001), available at http://www 
.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/pressrls/dprguide/dprguide.pdf. 
 126. Pesticide Use Reporting, supra note 121. 
 127. Id.  
 128. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, SUMMARY OF PESTI-
CIDE USE REPORT DATA 2009, at 2–9 (2010), available at http://www.cdpr.ca 
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California’s pesticide-use reporting system represents the 
largest undertaking of its kind, and serves as a model for fu-
ture pesticide disclosure programs.129 Notwithstanding the 
overall success of requiring full pesticide-use reporting, several 
commentators have noted that improvements to the reporting 
system would help connect the required disclosure with actual 
progress towards reduction of irresponsible use.130 When the 
program was first implemented, delays in reporting, errors in 
data collection, and increased agency workload often limited 
the effectiveness of the data in achieving actual reductions in 
irresponsible pesticide use.131 The sheer amount of full-use pes-
ticide reporting data in California placed a heavy burden on the 
state’s Department of Pesticide Regulation, and similar con-
cerns exist about disclosure systems in other states.132 Once ap-
plication data is collected in a single system, the influence of 
public perception and the threat of litigation help to minimize 
the agency burden by encouraging the prevention of irresponsi-
ble application as opposed to correcting misapplication after the 
fact.133 
C. REGULATORY INFLUENCE OF THE THREAT OF LITIGATION 
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in Bates v. 
Dow Agrosciences LLC,134 the public gained another tool in the 
fight to ensure responsible pesticide use: the threat of tort liti-
 
.gov/docs/pur/pur09rep/comrpt09.pdf (explaining how pesticide data is used, as 
well as commenting on and clarifying summaries of the data).  
 129. California Pesticide Use Reporting Data, PESTICIDE ACTION NETWORK 
PESTICIDE DATABASE, http://www.pesticideinfo.org/Docs/ref_PURCA.html#Missing 
( last visited Jan. 2, 2012) (explaining that California’s pesticide-use reporting 
system is one of the most comprehensive in the world).  
 130. See, e.g., CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, AN OVERVIEW OF 
CALIFORNIA’S UNIQUE FULL REPORTING SYSTEM 10 (2000), available at http:// 
www.cdpr.ca.gov/docs/pur/purovrvw/ovr52000.pdf (“Because full use reporting 
was a major program that no other state had undertaken, it was inevitable 
that there were problems to be worked out.”).  
 131. See KEGLEY ET AL., supra note 116, at 45–46 (detailing several of the 
problems with California’s pesticide-use reporting system and making recom-
mendations to improve its practical effects).  
 132. See CAL. DEP’T OF PESTICIDE REGULATION, supra note 130, at 7 (“This 
increased workload [from full-use pesticide-application reporting] impacted 
both DPR and the counties, and prompted DPR to analyze its operations and 
evaluates ways to address the problem.”).  
 133. See KEGLEY ET AL., supra note 116, at 45 (“An ounce of prevention is 
worth a pound of cure, and the surest approach to risk reduction is continual 
reductions in both the amount and intensity of pesticide use . . . .”). 
 134. 544 U.S. 431 (2005). 
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gation.135 In fact, in deciding Bates, the Supreme Court specifi-
cally contemplated the role of tort litigation against irresponsi-
ble handlers of poisonous substances.136 Echoing the rationale 
behind public disclosure systems like TRI, the Court also rec-
ognized that allowing common-law tort suits could incentivize 
chemical manufacturers and applicators to “gain more infor-
mation about their products’ performance in diverse set-
tings.”137 The Court clearly viewed common-law tort claims as 
not only a means by which wrongly injured parties could re-
ceive compensation, but also as a tool for encouraging responsi-
ble and informed pesticide-use decisions: “By encouraging 
plaintiffs to bring suit for injuries not previously recognized as 
traceable to pesticides such as [the pesticide there at issue], a 
state tort action of the kind under review may aid in the expo-
sure of new dangers associated with pesticides.”138 
Although the idea of private litigation playing a role in ef-
fective regulation is controversial, several commentators insist 
that litigation can have an important supplementary function 
as a regulatory tool.139 In the area of pesticide-use regulation, 
where agency oversight is often found lacking in effectiveness, 
the threat of litigation supplies a powerful incentive to pesti-
cide applicators to comply with government regulations.140 Fur-
thermore, given the limitations on agency resources to pursue 
thorough investigations of pesticide misuse, often times an in-
jured party’s only recourse is through a state-law tort claim for 
damages.141  
 
 135. Klass, supra note 10, at 124 (“[D]evelopments in FIFRA preemption 
and the common law as a result of Bates makes common law tort claims a 
more promising approach today than it was prior to the Court’s decision.”). 
 136. Bates, 544 U.S. at 432–33 (“The long history of tort litigation against 
manufacturers of poisonous substances adds force to the presumption against 
pre-emption, for Congress surely would have expressed its intention more 
clearly if it had meant to deprive injured parties of a long available form of 
compensation.”). 
 137. Id. at 451. 
 138. Id. (citing Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1541–42 
(D.C. Cir. 1984)). 
 139. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 72, at 695 (“[ I ]n addition to its critical 
role in compensating victims, the tort system plays an indispensable role in 
supplementing agency regulation of risky products and activities.”).  
 140. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 629–30 (discussing the role of citizens 
suits as an ex ante deterrent and an ex post corrective on regulated party  
behavior). 
 141. Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 121, at 471 (“[F]armworkers must 
rely on common law tort theories in order to obtain recovery for their injuries.”). 
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One of the traditional criticisms of regulation through liti-
gation involves the high costs of gaining access to crucial in-
formation through the judicial process.142 This complaint rings 
particularly true for parties who have been injured through 
pesticide exposure, because in many states the only way to ac-
cess that information is by initiating a risky and expensive 
lawsuit.143 Even though state government agencies typically 
have the authority to access pesticide-use information,144 laws 
that confer protected status on such data often impose high 
practical impediments for a party that suspects misuse has oc-
curred.145  
One of the biggest barriers facing a potential litigant who 
has suffered harm from pesticide exposure is the need to show 
the causal link between the misapplication of chemicals and 
the damage done.146 Just as in any other toxic tort case, a plain-
tiff in a pesticide tort action “must prove by a preponderance of 
the evidence that the pesticide exposure caused her injury or 
was at least a substantial contributing factor to the injury.”147 
Establishing causation in the face of a dearth of information 
surrounding the circumstances of the suspected misapplication 
means that the litigant is confronted with at best an immensely 
costly information-gathering process, and at worst an insur-
mountable barrier to recovery.148 
Given the new potential for the role of litigation in insuring 
responsible pesticide use, state laws frustrating that possibility 
 
 142. See Wagner, supra note 72, at 697 (“When manufacturers conceal in-
formation about product risks, they insulate themselves from accountability 
for the harms they might be causing to society. This privately held information 
can constitute a costly barrier—sometimes an insurmountable one—to regu-
lating product and related industrial risks.”). 
 143. See Klass, supra note 10 (explaining that because pesticide data is not 
available to individuals when the harm occurs, such lawsuits are costly and 
difficult). 
 144. See MINN. STAT. § 18B.37 (2010). 
 145. See Wagner, supra note 72, at 698 (“While in theory the legislative and 
executive branches should be able to access a great deal of private infor-
mation, the political nature of the process imposes real and often quite stark 
limits on the nature and extent to which regulation-relevant information is 
actually accessed and made more generally available to the public.”). 
 146. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 121, at 482 (“Regardless of 
what theory of recovery plaintiffs assert in pesticide cases, the primary diffi-
culty for most farmworkers will be establishing a causative link between the 
pesticide exposure and the resultant injury.”).  
 147. Id. at 483.  
 148. See id. at 490–97 (discussing the various burdens a farmworker faces 
in establishing causation in a pesticide tort case). 
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by shielding application data should be repealed. Instead, 
states should move toward adopting comprehensive, full-use 
pesticide reporting systems, such as the program implemented 
in California.  
III.  TRENDING TOWARD DISCLOSURE   
Pesticide reporting systems that make chemical applica-
tion data presumptively available to the public will dramatical-
ly lower the costs of pesticide tort litigation by providing easy 
access to the very evidence needed to show that pesticide mis-
use occurred. With the removal of one of the principal barriers 
to a successful tort suit for pesticide-related damages, the 
threat of liability for irresponsible pesticide use becomes too big 
for applicators to ignore.149 Furthermore, the chilling effect of 
the threat of litigation, as well as public-image concerns, will 
mitigate some of the commonly criticized high costs associated 
with disclosure systems and the use of litigation as a regulatory 
tool. States should shift away from laws that protect pesticide-
use information and move towards disclosure systems like Cali-
fornia’s to create an environment that pressures pesticide ap-
plicators to make certain of responsible use or face the threat of 
litigation. Minnesota should lead the way by repealing subdivi-
sion 5 of section 18B.37 so that chemical use data becomes pre-
sumptively available to the public, and by adopting a reporting 
system to make pesticide information easily accessible. The 
burden of implementing such a system is relatively small, given 
that much of the data is already being recorded, and the cost is 
justified by the equitable concern of allowing victims of irre-
sponsible pesticide use a viable remedy.  
A. INCENTIVES FOR RESPONSIBLE USE CREATED BY PUBLIC 
DISCLOSURE 
While the initial change in disclosing such information 
may result in costly lawsuits, having access to the correct in-
formation will increase an injured party’s chances of just com-
pensation, and will eventually lead to changes in applicator be-
havior.150 The principal effect of pesticide-use information 
 
 149. See id. at 471 (“[P]esticide applicators—who typically work on a con-
tract basis for growers—may be liable for a host of injuries resulting from the 
misapplication of pesticides and field drift.”). 
 150. See id. at 505 (“[T]ort actions can raise the price of maintaining the 
status quo for growers and manufacturers. By providing agribusiness with an 
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disclosure will be to bring about behavior modification in the 
form of responsible pesticide use in response to the threat of lit-
igation. The traditional influences of information disclosure—
public opinion, external monitoring, and third-party involve-
ment—will also play a prominent role as tort lawsuits put the 
public spotlight on irresponsible pesticide practices.151 The 
pressures created by public knowledge of pesticide-application 
practices gives applicators a powerful incentive to use utmost 
care when using toxic chemicals.  
Though the threat of litigation provides the rhetorical 
stick, data disclosure systems also offer pesticide users a carrot. 
Just as the information that came to light under the Toxic Re-
lease Inventory resulted in favorable public reviews from con-
scientious, toxic-release-reducing firms, large farms and agri-
businesses stand to gain significant positive publicity by 
touting their responsible pesticide-use record. Even smaller 
farms lacking a public profile have a great deal to gain through 
the disclosure of their responsible chemical practices. Since the 
great majority of pesticide application occurs in rural farming 
areas, strong ties of community often exist to bind neighbors 
and provide incentives to cooperate and insure the health of the 
community.152 Some instances of rural community negotiations 
have led to “good neighbor” agreements where farmers have 
voluntarily agreed to reduce the amount of pesticides applied in 
sensitive areas such as near homes or schools.153 If mandatory 
disclosure of toxic chemical releases motivated large industrial 
operations to reduce emissions to avoid being seen as a bad 
neighbor,154 such programs would be even more effective in ru-
ral farming areas with strong community ties. 
 
incentive to reform its ways, litigation brought by farmworkers may compen-
sate only a few, but catalyze changes that benefit many.”). 
 151. See, e.g., Fung & O’Rourke, supra note 100, at 118.  
 152. See California Pesticide Use Reporting Data, supra note 129 
(“[K]nowledge of typical pesticide applications by a particular grower has led 
to negotiations between farmers and community members in an attempt to 
reduce pesticide use near homes, schools, and parks.”). 
 153. Id.  
 154. See Mary Jane Angelo, Corn, Carbon, and Conservation: Rethinking 
U.S. Agricultural Policy in a Changing Global Environment, 17 GEO. MASON 
L. REV. 593, 645 (2010) (“Experience with the TRI has shown that simply re-
quiring industrial operations to report to the public the types and amount of 
toxic releases from industrial facilities results in significant reductions of toxic 
releases, in part because industry will voluntarily reduce its admissions to 
avoid being seen as a ‘bad neighbor’ . . . .”).  
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Furthermore, although some information reporting and 
disclosure systems are criticized on the grounds of the prohibi-
tive cost,155 pesticide-application information avoids this com-
plication since most of the data needed to establish a reporting 
system is already compiled by users and applicators.156 As dis-
cussed above, the Federal Pesticide Record Keeping Program 
requires private and commercial applicators to maintain fairly 
detailed records regarding the circumstances surrounding each 
application.157 Since most of the data needed to establish a da-
tabase is already on-hand with pesticide applicators, there is a 
much lower initial cost to creating a publicly accessible system 
of pesticide-use information. Thus a pesticide-use reporting 
system represents a relatively low-cost and effective way to en-
sure lawful and responsible pesticide application. And even 
though some initial costs related to implementing public disclo-
sure and allowing private lawsuits are inevitable, the evidence 
suggests that the huge benefits to the public of responsible pes-
ticide use likely outweighs those costs.158 
B. DISCLOSURE IS AN EQUITABLE SOLUTION  
Beyond the argument that pesticide-use disclosure leads to 
an efficient way of regulating pesticide applicators, making 
such information available to the public is also an equitable 
measure. Toxic chemicals such as restricted-use pesticides pre-
sent an extreme hazard to humans and animals residing in an 
area where they are regularly applied.159 People who are at risk 
of pesticide exposure have a right to know when, where, and 
how pesticides are applied so that they can take the appropri-
ate measures to protect themselves.160 This concern is already 
reflected in the labeling and registration requirements intend-
 
 155. See Sunstein, supra note 64, at 626–27 (suggesting that information 
disclosure systems implemented by the FDA or under OSHA are extremely 
expensive due to the cost of obtaining information); ELEFF, supra note 46, at 
54 (“An objection sometimes made against [a pesticide-use data collecting] sys-
tem is the alleged record-keeping burden it places on applicators.”). 
 156. ELEFF, supra note 46, at 54 (“[A] significant proportion of applicators 
already are required to keep records of their pesticide use.”). 
 157. See supra notes 25–29, and accompanying discussion. 
 158. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 72, at 711. 
 159. See, e.g., Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 121, at 438–39 (“Ingested 
and absorbed every day through the field worker’s nose, mouth, and skin, pes-
ticides are toxic substances designed to kill living organisms.”). 
 160. See KEGLEY ET AL., supra note 116, at 45 (arguing that growers, farm-
ers, and consumers have a right to know about the hazards associated with 
the potential adverse health effects of pesticide exposure).  
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ed to protect persons who are applying pesticides. Federal law 
imposes a high level of scrutiny before a toxic chemical can be 
registered for use as a pesticide.161 The same care should be 
taken to use pesticide-application data in protecting parties 
who risk exposure even though they are not themselves utiliz-
ing chemicals. 
The costs of pesticide application are unequally distributed 
across society. Although consumers benefit from the ad-
vantages of pesticides in agriculture just as surely as agricul-
tural producers and pesticide applicators, persons who reside in 
rural areas with a high risk of exposure to these chemicals bear 
a disproportionate share of the burden.162 By making applica-
tion data available to the general public, a semblance of bal-
ance is restored. Traditionally disadvantaged parties, such as 
farmworkers or rural residents, gain a means to protect them-
selves when they have access to the information about pesticide 
application in their area. The increased viability of litigation 
after critical facts are made available provides victims of irre-
sponsible pesticide use with a just remedy. Making pesticide-
application information available to the public is the first step in 
re-establishing a fair distribution of the costs of pesticide use. 
  CONCLUSION   
Based on the ascendancy of information regulation theory 
and the success of pesticide reporting programs in those areas 
that have adopted them, other states should implement a simi-
lar reporting requirement that would make pesticide-
application data available to the public. Although information 
disclosure programs in the environmental context have typical-
ly operated through market mechanisms, public opinion and 
other social pressures, the increased availability of state tort 
claims will exert an even more effective pressure on pesticide 
applicators to use chemicals in a responsible manner. Though 
litigation as a regulatory tool has been criticized as expensive 
and inefficient, much of this criticism is based on the high cost 
 
 161. See OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. EPA, REGULATORY IMPACT 
ANALYSIS: DATA REQUIREMENTS FOR REGISTERING PESTICIDES UNDER THE 
FEDERAL INSECTICIDE, FUNGICIDE AND RODENTICIDE ACT 27 (1982).  
 162. See Cunningham-Parmeter, supra note 121, at 447 (“While pesticide 
producers, users, and consumers benefit from the use of pesticides . . . costs 
are distributed disproportionately throughout the population (in terms of 
acute and chronic toxic effects such as cancer).” (alteration in original) (em-
phasis omitted) (quoting OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. EPA, supra 
note 159)). 
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of obtaining information needed to proceed with a lawsuit. This 
barrier to litigation, however, vanishes when pesticide-
application information is made easily accessible through a 
public pesticide-use reporting system. The knowledge that pes-
ticide-use data, and thus any evidence of misuse, is readily 
available to the public incentivizes pesticide applicators to en-
sure that their use is responsible and in compliance with label-
ing requirements and regulations. Pesticide-use reporting and 
public disclosure thus provides a powerful supplement to tradi-
tional regulatory methods, and helps encourage lawful and safe 
pesticide application. 
